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The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making 
Laura P. Moyer 





The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making 
 
The literature on ideology and decision making offers conflicting expectations about how judges’ 
ideology should affect their votes in cases that raise many legal issues.  Using cases from the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, I examine the strength of ideology as a predictor of sincere voting in 
single and multi-issue cases and test whether the same effect for ideology can be seen for liberal 
and conservative judges.  For all judges, ideology yields a larger effect as the number of issues 
increases; however, conservative judges are much more likely than liberal judges to cast sincere 
votes at all levels of complexity.  
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The Role of Case Complexity in Judicial Decision Making 
 A wide range of literature in political science emphasizes the centrality of ideology in 
explaining political elites’ behavior.  Studies of both Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have 
shown the ways that institutional constraints and norms can shape the opportunities for 
ideologically driven behavior, at both the agenda-setting stage (e.g., Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 
1999; Krehbiel and Rivers 1998) as well as the final decision stage (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993; 
Poole and Rosenthal 1991).  In studies of legislative behavior, ideology is viewed as a conscious, 
explicit motivation for individual behavior (Krehbiel 1993, 1998), though not necessarily the 
only possible motivating factor (Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Cox and McCubbins 
1993; Kingdon 1973).  This way of understanding ideology as an acceptable basis for political 
decision making reflects the values underlying elective office; namely, that because the 
electorate chooses legislators on the basis of their ideological positions on policy matters, it is 
then desirable for public officials to act in a manner consistent with their ideological position.i  
However, in the context of judicial institutions (and particularly the federal judiciary), 
there are strong norms opposing a conscious, explicit reliance on ideology as an appropriate 
basis for judicial decision making. Like the norms about acceptable legislative behavior, the 
norms about judicial actors also reflect the values underlying the selection mechanism used, 
which emphasizes independence and insulation from public opinion.  In this paper, I move away 
from the debate over whether ideology should matter in judicial decision making and connect to 
a more recent segment of research that acknowledges two points.  First, due to their legal 
education and professional socialization, legal decision makers believe that law matters, and this 
has consequences for how judges behave (Braman 2006; Baum 1997), particularly in 
institutional contexts other than the U.S. Supreme Court.  Second, this emerging body of 
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research acknowledges that it is vital to begin exploring the process by which ideological frames 
operate to influence legal decision making (i.e., asking, how ideology affects legal decision 
making, rather than, does ideology affect legal decision making).    
Competing perspectives exist about how ideology functions in judicial decision making.  
Braman and Nelson (2007) characterize these approaches as either “top down” or “bottom up.”  
In the “top down” model (e.g., Segal and Spaeth 1993), outcome decisions are made first and 
then affect which legal explanations are offered as a rationalization.  In the “bottom up” model 
(Baum 1999; Rowland and Carp 1996), judges’ attitudes behave like “information filters [that 
affect] … micro-decisions that occur in the process of legal reasoning” (Braman and Nelson 
2007, 942).   
I build on this literature by exploring the cognitive function that ideology plays in “noisy” 
decision-making environments.  Specially, I examine the role of ideology for appellate judges in 
“complex” cases that raise many legal issues, compared to cases that present fewer dimensions.  
The paper proceeds in the following manner.  First, I discuss the major existing theoretical 
perspectives on the function of ideology in judicial decision making, highlighting differences in 
how ideology is defined in each.  Next, I discuss how ideological frames might be used, 
unconsciously, to simplify judicial decision making under these conditions, and suggest several 
hypotheses.  Testing these on a sample of published decisions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals from 
1982 to 2002, I find evidence that increased complexity is not associated with ideologically 
“sincere” voting for liberals, but that it is for conservative judges. I conclude by discussing the 





Ideology and Judicial Decision Making 
Prominent models 
The function of ideology is viewed quite differently by the prominent political science 
models of judging.  In the attitudinal model articulated by Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002), 
ideology is the central explanatory factor for judicial decision making on the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  Under this account, judges make decisions based on their ideology:  “the Supreme Court 
decides disputes in light of the facts of the case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values of 
the justices. Simply put, Rehnquist votes the way he does because he is extremely conservative; 
Marshall voted the way he did because he was extremely liberal” (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 86).  
Attitudinalist scholars use the word “ideology” interchangeably with several other terms: “policy 
preferences” (Rohde and Spaeth 1976), “policy goals” (Klein 2002; Baum 1997), “ideal points” 
(Schubert 1965, 1974), “attitudes” (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002; Spaeth and Peterson 1971), 
and “values” (Pritchett 1948).   As described by Harold Spaeth (1972), the way ideology enters 
into the judicial decision-making process is a multi-step process.  First, a judge must hold an 
attitude, defined as “an interrelated set of beliefs about an object or situation” (65).  Judges will 
have attitudes about the parties involved in the case, as well as about the central legal issue in the 
case (Segal and Spaeth 2002).  When these attitudes interact, they will influence a judge’s 
behavior.ii  The attitudinal model implies that ideology serves as a simplifying mechanism in 
decision making:  when judges possess attitudes about the parties and the legal issue in the case, 
the range of possible outcomes is constrained.  Characterizations of the attitudinal model 
sometimes assume that this is a conscious process—what Gillman (2001) refers to as “low 
politics”—though Segal and Spaeth appear to be agnostic on whether judges are fully aware of 
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this tendency (Baum 2009), focusing less on how this mechanism works than on whether the 
evidence is consistent with decisions based on policy preferences.iii   
 In contrast, empirical work that employs the “legal model” de-emphasizes the role of 
ideology in decision making, instead focusing on legal variables, such as precedent (Kritzer and 
Richards 2003; Richards and Kritzer 2002), statutes (Cook 1977), doctrinal cues (George and 
Epstein 1992), and fact patterns (Segal 1984).iv  Another branch of scholarship classified under 
the rubric of the “legal model” comes from legal professionals and law school faculty and is 
typically (though not always) distinct from empirical scholarship in taking a strong normative 
position that judges can and should avoid relying on ideology in any way in their decisions.  A 
common criticism of such work is that it does not yield testable propositions (Cross 1997; Smith 
1994; Segal and Spaeth 1993).   
 Finally, strategic models argue that judges possess multiple goals, one of which is to 
achieve their preferred policy outcome.  Under the strategic model, ideology is said to matter 
within constraints, but perhaps more importantly, it posits a conscious recognition of attitudes 
and reliance on them in decision making.  For instance, Epstein and Knight (1998) refer to 
judges as “policy seekers” and note that individual judges have been quoted saying that they 
think they can influence public policy.   
 In two of these three major approaches, then, ideology plays a prominent role in 
explaining judicial decisions.  However, the specific causal mechanism by which ideology works 
to affect judicial decisions remains poorly understood.  In the section that follows, I discuss what 
we know about the role of ideology in cognition and how that knowledge might strengthen our 




Ideology and Cognition 
 Research in political psychology has generally characterized ideology as a coherent 
organizing framework for understanding the world (Converse 1964) that, at least in part, reflects 
individuals’ psychological needs (Jost et al. 2003).v  Several insights from this literature have 
immediate relevance for our inquiry into the bases of judicial decision making.  First, one 
common perspective on ideology’s role in cognition is that ideology can serve as a heuristic 
device, providing a cognitive “shortcut” when time and informational resources are scarce.  
Under this view, ideology’s role in decision making is likely to go unnoticed by the decision 
maker – that is, the decision maker unconsciously relies upon his or her own ideology as a guide.  
Related to this perspective is research that finds an effect for ideology in evaluating the 
credibility of sources; for example, conservative individuals are more likely to accept 
information from a conservative source as reliable than they would if they associated the 
information as coming from a liberal source, and vice versa (Bailey, Kamoie, and Maltzman 
2005; Lupia 2002). 
 Additionally, an individual’s ideological position may be associated with a particular 
cognitive style in terms of the differentiation between and integration of concepts (Tetlock 
1983).  A robust debate persists between scholars who argue that cognitive simplicity is 
associated primarily with conservatism (Sidanius 1985, 1988; Tetlock 1983, 1984) and those 
who argue for a more symmetrical relationship between ideological extremity and cognitive 
simplicity (Ray 1973; Rokeach 1960; Shils 1954).  However, more recent work has tended to 
find more support consistent with the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis (Altemeyer 1998; but see 
Gruenfeld 1995).  Overall, what unites this body of literature is the premise that ideology is an 
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important, and perhaps unavoidable, factor in influencing the content and manner of decision 
making. 
 In contrast, some legal scholars have argued that that judges’ professional training 
“inoculates” them from the cognitive phenomena observed by psychologists in studies of non-
judges’ decision making (Schauer 2007; but see Spellman 2007).  This is no doubt due to the 
strong norm in legal education against relying upon ideology as a basis for legal decisions.  
However, research using law students and magistrate judges as experimental subjects suggests 
that neither law school training nor practicing the law may be enough to overcome common 
cognitive errors, or to make ideology entirely irrelevant (Braman and Nelson 2007; Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, and Wistrich 2001).  On the other hand, Braman’s 2006 experimental study on 
ideology and the separability of merits and threshold issues concluded that motivated reasoning, 
by itself, is insufficient as an explanation of legal decision making; law and legal norms appear 
to have some ability to constrain decision makers from acting solely on their ideological 
attitudes.vi    
 Of course, the function of ideology in decision making differs depending on the 
institutional context.  Zorn and Bowie (2010) show that judicial ideology plays an increasingly 
larger role in decisional outcomes at each level in the federal judicial hierarchy.  Compared to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, ideology plays a less prominent role in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, for 
several reasons. First, as an intermediate court that must honor litigants’ right to one appeal, the 
Courts of Appeals are sent more “cut-and-dried” cases to decide, which require only 
straightforward applications of existing law and often result in unanimous rulings.  Second, 
ideology may be less relevant for circuit judges because, unlike the Supreme Court’s Rule of 
Four for granting certiorari, circuit judges do not select the cases they hear.  Substantial 
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empirical support has demonstrated that Supreme Court justices’ votes at the certiorari stage are 
consistent with ideological preferences (e.g., Boucher and Segal 1995), but the practice of 
random assignment in the Courts of Appeals makes it impossible for a circuit judge to “cherry 
pick” a case based on ideological grounds.  Finally, because of strong institutional norms in the 
Courts of Appeals favoring consensus and requiring majority rule, vii the ideology of the panel’s 
median judge is especially important in influencing the tenor and ideological direction of the 
panel’s majority opinion (Kastellac 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006; Tiller and 
Cross 1999).  However, recent work on the Courts of Appeals has also pointed to systematic 
differences between Democratic and Republican judicial appointees in the degree to which their 
ideological preferences are constrained by statutory language (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine 
2006). Judges appointed by Democratic presidents are less likely than their Republican 
colleagues to cast sincere votes in criminal cases, while Republican appointees are less likely to 
vote sincerely in discrimination cases.   
 Institutional context is also important in terms of understanding the coping strategies and 
heuristics used by decision makers. By three measures, it is abundantly clear that circuit court 
judges have very full plates.viii  On average, each year from 1983 to 2002, the Courts of Appeals 
averaged 4,092 filings, 2,071 cases terminated on their merits, and 26 merits cases per judge 
(Lindquist 2007).  One appellate judge observed, “Caseload pressures greatly reduce one's sense 
of satisfaction with the job. I feel dirty at the end of the day, having made many decisions 
without time for proper reflection and analysis” (Robel 1990).  Another lamented:  “It’s huge. 
It’s absolutely huge. And it does affect the way you work. Because when I was working on 10-
12 cases a month, it was far different than working on 30-40 cases. You have to give priority to 
certain cases; you’re always behind.”ix  Indeed, psychological research on group decision making 
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suggests that stress can cause more simplified, heuristic-based decision making (Karau and Kelly 
1992). 
 In the empirical scholarship focusing specifically on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, the 
relationship between case complexity, ideology, and judicial behavior has not been directly 
addressed.  Rather, when complexity has been considered, it has been as a control variable.  For 
example, Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek (2006) use two measures as proxies for complexity 
in their study of dissensus on appellate panels:  the presence of a cross appeal and the number of 
headnotes coded in the Songer (2002) database.x  They find that the number of legal issues, as 
indicated by the latter measure, is positively related to the likelihood of a concurrence, compared 
to joining the majority opinion, but is not related to the likelihood of a dissent.  Other work 
(Lindquist, Martinek, and Hettinger 2007) finds that case complexity (as measured by a factor 
analysis of legal issues and opinion length) is a significant predictor of decisions to affirm in part 
and reverse in part (“mixed” outcomes).  Taken together, these results suggest that as cases 
present more dimensions, judges are more likely to respond with fewer clear-cut decisions (i.e., 
separate opinions and split decisions).   
While, overall, the literature on ideology and cognition does not provide a clear set of 
expectations about the effects of judicial ideology in complex cases, it is possible to draw a few 
general conclusions from the extent research.  First, context is important, particularly in terms of 
decision making under stressful conditions.  It is reasonable to assume that, given the heavy 
caseloads faced by appellate panels, unconscious reliance on heuristics is probably a common 
response to that decision environment. Second, ideology operates differently for individuals at 
different points in the ideological spectrum.  This can be seen both in the political psychology 
literature and in work specifically examining federal appellate judges (Randazzo, Waterman, and 
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Fine 2006).  Building on these insights, in the section that follows, I lay out several hypotheses to 
test the competing contentions suggested by the literature.  
Theoretical Expectations 
The central assumption underlying this inquiry is that we should not expect ideology to 
have a uniform effect across all judges or all cases. If we imagine that ideology functions like a 
filter, it should simplify the decision making process by guiding judges as they prioritize 
different pieces of information.  As more and more pieces of information flow into that filter, 
two responses are possible.  Because of the stress associated with greater levels of complexity, 
ideology could become an even more influential heuristic, triggering more ideologically 
consistent voting as response to uncertainty (Karau and Kelly 1992). Alternatively, as 
complexity rises, it is possible that too many pieces of information would overwhelm an 
ideological framework, rendering it less meaningful as a filter and producing less ideologically 
consistent voting behavior.  Each of these competing explanations is represented in the two 
hypotheses below. 
Hypothesis 1:  In cases with multiple issues, ideology will exert a stronger effect on a 
judge’s vote than in cases with a single issue. 
Hypothesis 2:  In cases with multiple issues, ideology will exert a weaker effect on a 
judge’s vote than in cases with a single issue. 
 In addition, the political psychology literature gives us reason to question whether 
ideology performs an equivalent function for ideologically extreme judges (both liberal and 
conservative) as well as those who are moderate.  Past research on political elites offers mixed 
conclusions.  In early studies examining U.S. senators and Supreme Court justices, Tetlock 
(1983) and Tetlock et al. (1985) found that liberal and moderate political elites exhibited more 
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integrative complexity in their written and spoken rhetoric than conservatives.   However, a more 
recent examination of the Supreme Court (Gruenfeld 1995) found that this difference between 
liberals and conservatives was an artifact of majority opinion status, not purely ideology.  
Finally, one recent study of the Courts of Appeals found ideological differences in which 
substantive areas of statutory law constrain judges, again suggesting that the function of ideology 
may differ depending on one’s ideological position (Randazzo, Waterman, and Fine 2006).  The 
same study also found that ideological extremity was only associated with sincere voting by 
Republican appointees, but not Democratic appointees.  
 To further examine whether ideology mediates the relationship between complexity and 
sincere voting, I also introduce competing hypotheses that test whether any conditional 
relationship is symmetrical or asymmetrical. 
Hypothesis 3: In cases with multiple issues, judges with strong conservative preferences 
will be more likely to cast sincere votes than judges with strong liberal preferences. 
Hypothesis 4: In cases with multiple issues, judges with more extreme ideological 
positions will be more likely to cast sincere votes than moderate judges will in such cases. 
Data and Methods 
The data used for these analyses are derived from the Multi-User Database on the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, transformed so that a judge-vote was the unit of analysis (Songer 1997; 
Kuersten and Haire 2006) for the eleven numbered circuits for the years 1982 to 2002.  After 
excluding cases in which no legal issues were coded, this yielded a total of 11,392 judge-votes 
for analysis, all of which came from three-judge panels. 
To untangle the relationship between complexity and ideological voting, the dependent 
variable in the analysis predicts the likelihood of a judge casting a “sincere” vote.  To ascertain 
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what constitutes an ideologically “sincere” vote, the ideological direction of each vote must first 
be determined.  The U.S. Courts of Appeals database contains this information, labeling each 
vote as “liberal,” “conservative,” “mixed,” or “could not be classified.”  Ideological 
directionality is determined relative to each issue area; for example, in criminal cases, a vote in 
favor of the government is coded as a conservative outcome, while in economic regulation cases, 
a vote for the government is coded as a liberal outcome.  (More detailed information about 
coding of each issue area can be found in the database codebook, available at 
http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm). “Mixed” outcomes that supported both parties or that 
could not be clearly classified in ideological terms were omitted from this analysis.xi 
Next, following previous research that has uncovered significant differences between 
Democratic and Republican appointees, the dependent variable is coded as a “1” (sincere) if a 
Republican appointee cast a conservative vote or a Democratic appointee cast a liberal vote.  It is 
coded as a “0” (not sincere) if a Republican appointee cast a liberal vote, or a Democratic 
appointee cast a conservative vote.   Finally, because of the dichotomous nature of the dependent 
variable, I estimate a logistic regression model with robust standard errors.xii    
Independent Variables 
In order to evaluate the relationship between complexity and ideologically sincere voting, 
it is important to control for judicial ideology. A continuous variable is superior to a 
dichotomous approach because it allows for a more precise and nuanced measure as well as 
allowing distinctions to be made between ideological extremes and moderates (Epstein, Martin, 
Segal, and Westerland 2007).  For these reasons, I use the Giles, Hettinger, and Peppers (2001) 
ideology scores, which range from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative) and reflect the 
preferences of the appointing president or the home state senator(s) when senatorial courtesy is 
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present.  However, I adjust this measure somewhat to reflect bargaining between the president 
and the home state senator by averaging the two NOMINATE scores when senatorial courtesy is 
present.  The values for Judge Ideology in this sample range from -.689 to .6, with a median 
value of .25. To further distinguish among judges ideologically in terms of being “moderate” or 
“extreme,” I then created a dummy variable called Extreme that is equal to 1 if the judge was at 
the 75th percentile or greater among other appointees of the same party, and 0 if they fell below 
the 75th percentile.xiii  To account for the possibility that ideologically sincere voting may be 
driven by whether the judge is a part of the majority coalition on the circuit, Majority is equal to 
1 if the judge was of the same party as 51 percent or more of the circuit, zero if the circuit was 
evenly balanced (50-50), and -1 if the judge was a part of the minority party on the circuit.  
Both practitioners and academics have developed measures of case complexity, albeit for 
different purposes.  Court management efforts to measure case complexity have generally been 
geared toward improving efficiency in the disposition of cases, though such efforts are not 
uniform across all circuits (McKenna, Hooper, and Clark 2000).  In contrast, political scientists 
and empirical legal scholars have generally included various measures of case complexity as 
control variables in their analyses, rather than as the central explanatory variable (e.g., Lindquist, 
Martinek, and Hettinger 2007; Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006).   
For the purposes of the present inquiry, I focus on the aspect of complexity that relates to 
the number of legal concepts involved in a case (see Johnson 1987). This variable is a count of 
the number of legal concepts identified in an opinion, taken from the Multi-User Database on the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals (Kuersten and Haire 2006; Songer 1997).  Under each area of law 
(criminal, civil disputes between private entities, civil disputes between private entities and 
government, and administrative agency appeals), coders identified whether specific legal issues 
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were present in the opinion or not.   (The legal concepts coded for each area of law appear in the 
appendix.) For this analysis, concepts mentioned in the opinion were coded as 1 and zero if 
otherwise, then summed.xiv  Legal Complexity ranges from 1 to 13 issues, with a median of 2 
issues (standard deviation = 1.29).  To adjust for the skewed distribution of this variable, I 
transformed the raw number by taking its square root, which changes the range to run from 1 to 
3.6.  I also included a dummy variable to control for the presence of a cross appeal, which by 
definition, raises multiple issues, since both parties are appealing separate issues from the district 
court’s decision (Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006). Cross Appeal and Legal Complexity 
tap into different aspects of multiple issues, as evidence by their low correlation (r = .09). 
To gauge whether the effect of ideology on sincere voting is conditioned by complexity, I 
included two interaction terms. The first, Ideology*Legal Complexity, examines whether 
differences exist between liberal and conservative judges in how case complexity conditions 
their vote.  The second multiplicative term, Extreme*Legal Complexity, tests whether differences 
exist between ideological moderates and extremes with respect to this conditional relationship.  
  Additionally, I include several control variables. I control for the participation of the 
U.S. government, which retains a strong advantage in litigation (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 
1999).  The variable U.S. government takes the value of -1 if the United States is a party and 
takes the position contrary to the judge’s preferences, zero if the United States is not a party in 
the case, and +1 if the United States is involved and takes a position that is consistent with a 
judge’s “sincere” position.  To account for the court’s overwhelming tendency to affirm lower 
courts’ decisions, Lower Court is equal to one if the district court ruled in the direction consistent 
with the judge’s preferences, and equal to zero if it ruled in the opposing direction.  Finally, 
because a judge’s propensity to cast a “sincere” vote may be a function of the ideological 
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positions of his or her colleagues on the panel, I created a variable that is the absolute value of 
the distance between the majority opinion author and the panel median (Panel Distance). 
[Table 1 about here] 
Findings 
Table 1 displays the results from the logit models.xv  In the first column of results (Model 
1), the model presented does not include any interaction terms.  Here, we can get a sense of how 
ideology and complexity affect sincere voting separately, before examining whether they have a 
conditional effect.  We can see that Legal Complexity by itself does not exert a statistically 
significant effect on sincere voting, although the coefficient is positively signed.  Conservative 
judges are significantly more likely than their liberal colleagues to cast ideologically sincere 
votes, and counter to expectations, moderate judges have a higher probability of voting sincerely 
than more ideologically extreme judges.  Looking at the other control variables, when the 
position of the lower court is consistent with a judge’s preferences, or when the U.S. government 
takes a position consistent with a judge’s preferences, it is more likely that the judge will cast an 
ideologically sincere vote.  In particular, the Lower Court variable exerts a very large effect; with 
all other variables held at their median values, a one-unit change in Lower Court (from zero to 
one) causes the likelihood of a sincere vote to jump from .51 to .95.  This finding reflects the 
tendency of appellate judges to affirm lower court decisions, but also emphasizes, consistent 
with the attitudinal model, that it is easier to agree with the district court when that outcome is 
consistent with one’s ideological preferences. The Majority variable is positive and significant, 
with a relatively large effect as well.  When all other variables are held at their median or modal 
values, moving from being in the minority coalition to the majority coalition within the circuit 
increases the probability of a sincere vote from .36 to .51.   
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 [Figure 1 about here] 
In the second column of Table 1, the model is estimated with an interaction term between 
Ideology and Legal Complexity, which allows us to evaluate the first three hypotheses.  When the 
model is estimated including this multiplicative term, the results show that Ideology*Legal 
Complexity is not statistically significant. However, because the statistical and substantive 
significance for interaction terms are not always accurately reflected by the coefficients and 
standard errors reported in model output, it is important to calculate the marginal effects and 
standard errors for scenarios of interest (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Norton, Wang, and 
Ai 2004).  Setting all other variables at their median values and the lower court variable at zero, I 
calculated the marginal effects for both moderates and extremes as the Legal Complexity variable 
increased from its minimum (1) to its maximum (3.6) for judges at the 25th and 75th percentile of 
ideology.  Figure 1 shows the conditional effect of legal complexity on ideology for both liberal 
and conservative judges.  Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the probability of a sincere vote 
increases somewhat for all judges as the number of issues in a case rises.  This allows us to reject 
Hypothesis 2 (which predicted the opposite result). Additionally, Figure 1 clearly shows that 
conservative judges are significantly more likely to cast a sincere vote than liberal judges, 
supporting Hypothesis 3.  Over the range of legal issues, the probability for conservative judges 
increases from .62 to .65, while the probability for liberal judges increases from .35 to .39.  At 
the highest levels of complexity (3.4 and higher), however, there are no meaningful differences 
between conservative and liberal judges. xvi  
 [Figure 2 about here] 
In the third column of results in Table 1 (Model 3), an interaction term between Extreme 
and Legal Complexity allows us to test Hypothesis 4; namely, that ideologically extreme judges 
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will be more likely to cast sincere votes in conditions of higher complexity than moderate judges. 
The results for the control variables in this model are identical to those in Model 1, and the 
coefficient on the interaction term Extreme*Complexity fails to reach conventional levels of 
statistical significance.  However, when the marginal effects and standard errors are calculated 
(with all variables held at their median values) and graphed, moderates are actually more likely 
than ideological extremes to cast sincere votes when a case has low to medium levels of 
complexity. (At higher levels of complexity, the confidence intervals overlap, signifying that the 
two groups are no longer statistically distinguishable from one another.)  Over the range of Legal 
Complexity, however, we see no evidence for either moderates or extremes that complexity 
increases (or decreases) the likelihood of sincere voting, as the relationship is flat.  Thus, we can 
conclude that Hypothesis 4 is not supported, since ideological extremity is not positively related 
to sincere voting.   
[Table 2 about here] 
Finally, we examine the possibility that the findings are an artifact of the type of case 
(civil or criminal) being heard.  Since a large portion of the appellate docket is made up by 
criminal cases, which are typically affirmed at a higher rate than other types of cases (Lindquist 
2007), one possible explanation for the findings above is that conservative judges’ greater 
propensity to vote sincerely is being driven by case type.  Table 2 shows the results from 
additional analyses that examine civil and criminal cases separately.xvii Models 4 and 5 are 
estimated including the interaction between Ideology and Legal Complexity and between 
Extreme and Legal Complexity to test for conditional effects within these subsamples.xviii  In 
these models, Extreme*Legal Complexity is the only statistically significant conditional 
relationship, and it only is significant in civil cases in a relatively narrow range.  Moderates are 
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more likely than ideological extremists to cast sincere votes in civil cases and increasingly more 
so as Legal Complexity increases from its minimum to its 90th percentile value. (Graphs for 
other, non-significant interaction terms omitted because of space).  Consequently, it does not 
appear that the results for the conditional effect of complexity on ideology that we saw above are 
being driven by outcomes in criminal cases.   
[Figure 3 about here] 
In sum, we can draw several conclusions from these findings.  First, as shown in Figure 
1, we find evidence that ideology has a stronger influence as a case contains more issues, though 
the effect is not overwhelming.  This suggests that ideology can be a somewhat effective filter in 
simplifying the decision environment as it becomes more “crowded” with information.   
In addition, Figure 1 shows that differences exist between liberal and conservative judges 
with respect to the general propensity for casting ideologically sincere votes, and that these 
differences are not a function of ideological extremism.  Specifically, conservative judges are 
more likely to cast sincere votes across the board and are increasingly likely to do so as a case 
becomes more complex. This provides some tentative support for the work of some political 
psychologists (see Jost et al. 2003a for an overview), who have argued that conservatism is 
composed of a number of underlying traits (e.g., intolerance of ambiguity and the need for order, 
structure, and closure) that are associated with eliminating nuance and simplifying complex 
phenomena. Obviously, the normative implications of these studies are quite controversial (see 
Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Jost et al. 2003b), but given the results shown here, we can at least 
say that conservatism appears to help conservative judges make ideologically consistent 
decisions in the midst of “noisy” decision environments.  Liberal judges, too, rely more on their 
ideology as cases become more complex, but their ideological position does not yield nearly as 
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large an effect, predicting a sincere vote only about one-third of the time.  This difference 
between liberal and conservative judges cannot be explained by the attitudinal model alone, since 
it suggests that ideology acts as a stronger filter for conservative judges than it does for liberal 
judges.   
Discussion 
Prior research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals has demonstrated that, rather than pitting 
law against ideology as an explanatory mechanism, elements of both factors play an important 
part in explaining judicial decision making (Klein 2002; Segal, Songer, and Cameron 1995).  
Much of the time, circuit court judges come to the same conclusion, liberal and conservative 
alike, perhaps because the law is often easily applied to many appeals—and also because the 
decision environment promotes consensual decision-making norms.  On the other hand, the 
evidence shows that measures of judge ideology, both at the individual and panel level, are 
consistently significant predictors of voting behavior. 
The findings described herein have important implications for the “attitudes versus law” 
debate among judicial scholars. While much of the work in this subfield has focused on 
modeling law as a uniform constraint, this study considers how the law matters from an 
information processing perspective.  I argue that it is vital to consider the complexity of cases 
when making arguments about the relative power of law or ideology as explanatory mechanisms.  
The results show that the effect of ideology as a “filter” grows increasingly stronger as case 
complexity increases, for all judges.  However, conservative ideology is associated with a higher 
tendency to cast sincere votes at all levels of complexity, compared to liberal ideology.  The lack 
of equivalence between the two groups is notable, given earlier work showing that Republican 
and Democratic judicial appointees are constrained differently by statutory language in criminal 
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case and employment cases.  These findings underscore the importance of understanding the 
specific psychological mechanisms at work when we talk about ideology’s role in judging, rather 
than relying upon “black box” accounts of judicial decision making.xix  
Certainly, there are some limitations to this study that bear mentioning.  Using the 
number of legal issues in the opinion without also having access to the accompanying briefs 
means that we are unable to observe issue suppression and other informal mechanisms that 
panels use to reach consensus when a case presents many elements.  Indeed, some level of issue 
suppression is routine for judges, who regularly condense lengthy legal briefs with long lists of 
issues into relatively pithy opinions (Haire and Moyer 2008).  Unfortunately, most circuits do not 
make their briefs electronically available, and even in those circuits that do, access to briefs is 
gained only through a fee-based service called PACER.  Future research should explore the role 
that these briefs play in judges’ decision making in the federal appellate courts.  Additionally, 
research should examine other possible operationalizations of a “legal issue”:  for example, to 
test whether the effects differ across merits and procedural issues.  
The lively debate over judicial decision making will no doubt continue for many years to 
come.  Nevertheless, scholars should continue to explore the nuances of both legal and 
psychological influences in order to gain a fuller understanding of the process of decision 
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Table 1:  Likelihood of a Sincere Vote  
U.S. Courts of Appeals (1982-2002) 
 









Ideology and complexity variables   
Legal complexity 
 
.017   
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Ideology  .956**   
(.085) 
1.02**      
(.159) 
.955**   
(.085)      
Extreme ideology  -.445**   
(.074) 
-.444**   
(.074) 









-- -- .024**   
(.056) 
Control variables   
Non-unanimous  .324*    
(.132) 
.323*    
(.132) 
.325*   
(.132) 
Majority party in 
circuit  
.306**      
(.036) 
.306**    
(.036) 
.306**   
(.036) 
Cross appeal  
 
-.055   
(.138) 
-.054    
(.138) 




.995**    
(.056) 
.996**    
(.057) 
.995**    
(.056) 
Lower court decision 2.97**    
(.088) 
2.97**    
(.088) 
2.97**    
(.088) 
Ideo. distance from 
panel  
.050    
3(.134) 
.051    
(.134) 




-.542**    
(.116) 
-.538**   
(.116) 
-.515**   
(.135) 
N 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R2 
11392 
p < .001 
.4297 
11392 
p < .001 
.4297 
11392 
p < .001 
.4297 
 









Figure 1.  Interaction of Judge Ideology and Legal Complexity. 
 
Note:  Ideology ranges -.4 to .4 (the interquartile range), and the number of legal issues runs 
from its minimum to maximum value. All continuous variables set at their median values. 
Dummy variables set at moderate judge, in the majority of the circuit, lower court decision not 









Figure 2. Interaction of Ideological Extremity and Legal Complexity. 
 
Note: All continuous variables set at their median values. Dummy variables set at moderate 
judge, in the majority of the circuit, lower court decision not consistent with preferences, no U.S. 
government participation, and no dissent. Where the confidence intervals overlap, the difference 
in the probability between a moderate and an ideologically extreme judge are not statistically 




 Table 2:  Likelihood of a Sincere Vote  
Subsample: Civil and Criminal Cases 
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Notes: **p < .01, *p < .05, two-tailed tests.  All marginal effects and standard errors were 
calculated for all interaction terms, but the only statistically significant relationship was in Model 








Figure 3. Interaction of Ideological Extremity and Legal Complexity. 
 
Note: All continuous variables set at their median values. Dummy variables set at majority of the 
circuit, lower court decision not consistent with preferences, no U.S. government participation, 
and no dissent. Where the confidence intervals overlap, the difference in the probability between 






Appendix A:  Legal Issues Included in the Legal Complexity Variable  
Criminal Civil Civil con’t 
Prejudicial conduct by 
prosecution 
Insanity defense 
Improper influence on jury 
Jury instructions improper 
Jury composition or selection  
Death penalty  




Search and seizure 
Admissibility of evidence 
Challenges to plea bargain 
Inadequate counsel 
Right to counsel violated  




Dismissal by lower court 
upheld on procedural grounds 
Did court rule for defendant 




Weight of the evidence 
Pre-trial procedure 
Procedure at trial 
Post-trial procedure/motion 
Attorneys fees 
Abuse of discretion 
Alternative dispute resolution  
Injunction 
Summary judgment  
Conflict between state and 
federal law 
Conflict between domestic 
law and foreign law 
International law 
Conflict of laws between 
states 
Discovery 
Other civil issue that favored 
appellant 
Substantial evidence rule 
De novo 
Clearly erroneous standard 
Agency discretion 
Decision subject to judicial 
review 
Agency used appropriate 
standard or interpretation 
Notice given 
Administrative law judge 
Agency acquisition of 
information 
Freedom of Information 
Comment 
Record adequately developed 
Diversity of parties 






                                                          
i See Bonneau and Hall (2009) for a similar argument in the context of judicial elections. 
ii This is also referred to in terms of “salience.”   
iii As a caveat, it should be noted that for judges in different institutional environments, some of 
the prerequisites for the behavior described by Segal and Spaeth are not satisfied.  For instance, 
lower federal court judges and many state court judges have little or no say in choosing which 
cases they will hear.  In addition, they may be motivated by ambition for higher judicial office, 
or constrained by the possibility of reversal by a higher court. 
iv See Bartels (2009) for a newer strain of scholarship that acknowledges the role of both law and 
ideology in judicial decision making. 
v The literature on political attitudes and behavior has also recognized that, in some situations, 
ideology is malleable, and might be issue-specific. However, I follow Jost et al. (2003, 342 fn2) 
in assuming that we can distinguish between a stable core of beliefs that are associated with 
individual ideology (e.g., preferences about change, inequality, and order) and attitudes on 
specific issues (e.g., crime).   
vi The motivated reasoning account suggests a biased decision process, by which decision makers 
are predisposed to find authorities consistent with their ideological preferences more convincing 
than authorities that conflict with those preferences.   
vii While the Supreme Court also operates by majority rule, substantially different norms exist in 
that institution about separate opinion writing.  From 1950 to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court 
maintained a dissent rate that was well above fifty percent (Haynie 1992), compared to a dissent 
rate of 7 percent on the Courts of Appeals during the same period (Songer, Sheehan, and Haire 
2000).   As a result of the prevalence of consensus, the median judge on a Courts of Appeals 
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panel yields more of an influence over her colleagues, in terms of the ideological direction of the 
court’s opinion, than the median justice on the Supreme Court. 
viii Yearly terminations on the merits is a preferable measure to total filings, since the latter does 
not signify whether the court considered the arguments and resolved the case in that year. 
ix Interview with the author (December 2008). 
x One limitation of using the headnotes variable is that it is truncated by the number of fields 
coded in the Songer database (the variable ranges from 0 to 7). 
xi The substantive findings are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable in 
which a sincere vote is coded as a dichotomy based on the judge ideology scores, rather than 
party of appointing president. (See Appendix C.) 
xii I also ran the models using a cross-sectional time-series analysis (Zorn 2001). As the results of 
both methods were substantively equivalent, I report the logit results for ease of interpretation. 
Another alternative specification would be to include fixed effects to control for circuit-specific 
tendencies.  However, introducing these controls produces unacceptably high levels of 
collinearity with the Majority variable (>.90), so I opted not to include them.  
xiii When the observations are separated by party of appointing president, 24 percent of all 
Democratic judge-votes were classified as coming from “extreme” judges, while 40 percent of 
all Republican judge-votes had this designation.  
xiv This measure does not tap into the relative weight of each issue, or into the court’s ruling on 
each issue.  In addition, the dependent variable in the analysis is coded relative to the outcome of 
the entire case, so it is possible that in case with multiple issues, some, but not necessarily all, of 
these issues will have been decided consistent with the outcome of the case.   
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xv The legal concepts were coded as part of the Multi-User database to reflect whether the court 
addressed the issue in a way that favored the appellant, the appellee, both (mixed decisions), or if 
the court did not address the issue at all. My coding scheme simply notes whether the court 
addressed the issue at all, regardless of which side prevailed and sums the number of issues 
addressed by the court in its majority opinion.   
xvi When the value for Lower Court is set at 1, the probability of sincere voting for liberal and 
conservative judges increase dramatically, reflecting the powerful effect of this control variable.  
Liberal judges’ probabilities range from .91 to .92 (compared to .35 to .39 when Lower Court is 
equal to 0), while a conservative judge goes from .98 to .99 (compared to .62 - .65).  After Legal 
Complexity exceeds 3, the differences between liberal and conservative judges are no longer 
statistically different from one another.  
xvii Supplemental analyses were also conducted using only civil rights and liberties cases, since 
ideology may be more salient in such cases. However, the substantive findings remain largely the 
same. The only difference is that the Extreme weakens in statistical significance from p < .001 to 
p < .10.    
xviii When the models are estimated without the interaction terms, Legal Complexity fails to reach 
conventional levels of significance, and the results largely mirror the findings in Table 1. 
xix This is not to say that liberal or conservative judges consciously rely on shortcuts in the place 
of legal arguments, or that they are simply trying to decide cases quickly without regard to the 
quality of their work; indeed, there is ample evidence that judges value and strive to produce 
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